| # | SUBJECT,C,10 | AUTHOR,C,50 | YEAR,C,5 | MONTH,C,9 | TITLE,C,102 | JOURNAL,C,8 | VOL,C,5 | NUM,C,4 | PP0,C,4 | PP1,C,4 | KEYWD,C,100 | MARK,C,4 | COMMENT,M
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| 1 | Micro | Brown, Donald J., W.P. Heller, R.M. Starr | 1989 | January | Two-Part Marginal Cost Pricing Equilibria | | | | | | | ap | |
| 2 | Game | Crawford, Vicent P. | 1989 | March | An "Envolutionary" Explanation of Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil's Experimental Results on Coordination | UCSD | | | | | coordination equilibrium refinement experimental economics multiple equilibria | ap | |
| 3 | EMT | Kuan, Chung-Ming | 1989 | May | Learning Recurrent Networks by the Dynamic and Standard Back-Propagation Methods | | | | | | | ap | |
| 4 | Inf | McAfee, R.P. and J. McMillan | 1989 | April | Organizational Diseconomies of Scale | IRPS | | | | | Incentive compatilbe principal agents Incentive Compatibility | ap | |
| 5 | I.O. | Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts | 1989 | March | Rationalizability, Learning and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities | Stanford | | | | | | ap | |
| 6 | Game | Stinchcombe, Maxwell B. | 1989 | April | Continuous-time Game Theory | UCSD | | | | | | ap | |
| 7 | Game | Banks J.S. and Joel Sobel | 1987 | May | Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Game | EMT | 55 | 3 | 647 | 661 | refinement | sig | |
| 8 | Game | Cho In-Koo and Joel Sobel | 1987 | | Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signaling Games | UCSD | 87 | 10 | | | refinement | sig | |
| 9 | I.O. | Crawford, V. P. and J. Sobel | 1982 | November | Strategic Information Transmission | EMT | 50 | 6 | 1431 | 51 | 234A 88F | | |
| 10 | I.O. | Guasch, J.L. and J. Sobel | 1983 | | Breeding and Raiding: A Theory of Strategic Production of Skills | UCSD | 83 | 1 | | | | | |
| 11 | Game | Sobel, J. | 1983 | | Disclosure of Evidence and Resolution of Disputes: Who should Bear the Burden of Proof? | UCSD | | | | | | | |
| 12 | Game | Cho, In-Koo and J. Sobel | | | Unique Outcomes in signalling Games | UCSD | | | | | | sig | |
| 13 | I.O. | Emons W. and J. Sobel | 1988 | | On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical | UCSD | 88 | 39 | | | | | |
| 14 | I.O. | Sobel, Joel | 1988 | | How (and When) to Communicate to Enemies | UCSD | 88 | 36 | | | | |
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